Property and ownership are not the same

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1. General relations between property and ownership

Etymologically speaking, the word property contains several meanings: 1) property denotes a natural quality, which belongs to us without our creativity or action; 2) what we come to possess by means of a creative act or some other kind of activity; 3) anything that has fallen into our possession by a simple application of social norms. All these meanings refer to *a belonging* of some sort, but it is important to make a distinction between them both from the point of view of an individual and a society. It is essential to make a distinction between an *inherent* feature (das ist ihm) and what has come to belong to us (sich etwas zu machen). We possess both our natural properties and the things whose *owners* we have become.

The etymology of the word property could be explained in terms of an epigenetic model: property is, then, seen as a social phenomenon, which has been developing and changing as a consequence of the development of man and society. With the formation of man's community property was turned into a social phenomenon and at the same time a social nature of man and of his community was created by the sublimation of nature, work, social norms and the act of living together. All this led to a *generic nature* of man. The act of communal life is a *natural reality of property*, which serves as a base of an individual's and a community's *self* and the rate of development of *human needs* and their fulfillment. This self creates *ownership*.

Ownership as a feature of property reveals a generic nature of man and society. This feature of property is being expressed as a social product of an institutionalized property relation and a "pure self" of an individual and all sorts of ownership in a society (state). Property is an abstract form of man and society, which develops through an inevitable unity of reason and history into a peculiar social phenomenon and which is being realized as ownership of an individual or a community. This represents a historically achieved beginning of man and his community.

Man and his community break their close connection with nature by creating new conditions of living, thus leaving aside the initially found, natural ones. The generated state becomes their ownership. From his close connection with nature man "moves" to his community which he uses in order to "conquer" space and time.

Producers gain the right to dominate other members of the community and their community gains dominance over another community. In this way ownership becomes a basic cause of *differentiation* between and within communities.

In the process of historical development of society a direct producer of material and spiritual values is not the only one who becomes an owner. Certain individual, institution or organization may become a direct owner by law, through a legally accepted work, by inheritance, by application of customs, religious and ethical norms.

Ownership is a *special social category* in terms of the value of its cultural contents, its scope, interests, needs it satisfies and the impact it has on an individual and a community. The categorization of ownership has made it *a basis for determining* both an individual and a society.

As complex social categories property and ownership bear several meanings.

In the area of law and economics the terms property and ownership are taken to be synonymous. In an economical sense property and ownership are understood as the overall production, which is today greatly influenced by the field of technology.

Legally speaking, a legal entity's maximal number of legal rights to possess certain material and spiritual values represents its personal right of property or ownership. (A legal institute of property i.e. ownership)

The sociological approach takes into account both legal and economic elements, but from the point of view of a sociologist, these elements do not offer a full understanding of property and owner-

ship. Both property and ownership are institutionalized and institutionalizing categories.

First of all, ownership is connected with the protection of *owner's private rights* and the protection of these rights is closely connected to a care for *public interests*. This is an *ontological duality* of ownership, which provides a *fundamental combination of legality and efficiency of property relations as a whole*. It is obvious that both property and ownership have their peculiarities but are logically united by the aim of acquiring, possessing and managing goods. Their categorization makes the relations between global, endogenous and integral inevitable, but the endogenous feature has a special importance for the creation of an enterprising spirit and a motivation for success.

Reflexivity, temporal and spatial detachment, a complementary destruction and a new creation (Gidens) as dynamic consequences of modern age have created a new and important context for the sociological understanding of property, thus for the understanding of ownership as well.

With industrialism strong tendencies occurred towards a system in which a piece of information (abstract systems, symbols, expert system) is much more important than a production of goods. There is a new relation of space and time, the space leaves a place, "impersonal relationships" are built and international phenomena are getting more influential and important. An owner and ownership got so much apart that both could go by their own rules, thus giving a new meaning to trust and confidence. This becomes so obvious especially if we have in mind that modern age as a special phenomenon generates power, violence, brutality, industrialization of war and gray economy as *features of ownership*.

When defining subjects and objects of property and ownership, the outstanding characteristics of modern age have to be considered which as institutionalized and institutionalizing categories are closely connected to the former.

A sociological understanding of property has to be drawn from logic of a social system and people's activities, which represent a theoretical, institutionalized, legal and real level and which bring about synchronized *approach and verification methods*.

At the same time they provide a basis for a full understanding of ownership as a special social category.

2. The peculiarities of property and ownership

While building his own community man becomes a being of property or a generic being. Only as such he can create ownership. A man closely connected to nature and without a community cannot create ownership, nor can he dominate or be dominated by the other. Man and his community evolved gradually so that the fulfillment of man's material and spiritual needs could not be based upon mental components of generic essence only. This process is inevitably influenced by history, by already existing natural and creative components, i.e. by an achieved stage of development of man and his community.

Human desire to possess could not be said to be caused by a simple biological factor at a level of mere existence, but by a special combination of man's existence and essence. In such a way, the problem of naturalness of certain lusts, desires and aspirations is always regarded in terms of a generic essence of man and society. The fact is that every individual automatically becomes not only an owner of his own, but also of the other's need and that is why property and ownership cannot be considered as same.

In the genesis of the relationship between property and ownership there comes a crucial moment when the individual (worker) suffers consequences of his own work; this moment represents a split between property and ownership or better say an extraction of ownership from property.

While community was the only property of its members and the only property of the community were its members, their work influenced all the members in the same manner. In such a society there existed only a category of property, while the category of ownership was not yet developed.

The extraction of ownership out of property is very transparent in the area of work. The question is what property and ownership are when the working process and its results are being considered and what in a sociological sense its consequences are. Important contents of property are tied to the fact that a worker produces goods

and satisfies both his own and the need of others and this is an expression of a generic nature of man as a social being. Like artifact (Eigenhandel) a product(s) belong(s) to a worker because he made it (them) with his own hands, but the contents of ownership do not depend on a worker as an immediate producer. Very frequently, the worker does not control his own product nor does he by means of it control the other. An individual who controls the worker's production becomes an owner and in such a way he becomes superior to others and even to the worker who produced the product. In this process an institutionalized category of property becomes clearly defined. It is a social phenomenon in which the worker produces his product, which greatly determines worker's self and his existence and also the other's tendencies to become an owner of the worker's product. Where existence and essence of man and his community meet, this social phenomenon is exclusively a property relation. The differentiation between property and ownership is also made by those who justify ownership by natural law. Locke proves that working abilities naturally belong to an individual and that ownership is justified if one says that "an object belongs to a person who interferes with it thorough his work" (Leksikon temeljnih pojmova demeokratije, Zagreb, 1990). However, Locke adds that it is justified "only if there is enough of that object for the others". According to Locke an object belongs to a person who produced it, in case this is not preventing somebody else from producing the same thing. Land belongs to a person who cultivates it in case there is enough of quality land for all the individuals who want to cultivate it. It is obvious that the theory of natural law cannot explain property and ownership without taking into account work and relationship with the other. Both of them are relations of exclusive contents.

The genesis of property and ownership shows convincingly that, from a sociological viewpoint at least, it is not permissible to reduce property to ownership relations i.e. property to ownership.

The consequences of the extraction of ownership out of property are numerous and the most important are:

 The real sense of property is not lost, besides the fact that ownership is extracted from it, it remains one of the major elements in the process of determining generic nature of man and his community;

- Ownership as a means of substitution or realization takes over some of the functions of property.
- Being concrete, ownership has a special impact on an individual and a society when compared to that of property;
- By extracting ownership from property a collective as a surrogate for community occurs.

Ownership concretizes a subject (an individual, group or institution) and an object of ownership on the basis of institutionalized property relation in a certain society. The problem of ownership is solved in the context of property, ownership is independent from property, but they still interact. The conflict within property i.e. the conflict between the general and particular is partly resolved here, which makes it possible that neither property nor ownership disappear. Ownership cannot act as a surrogate for property i.e. as a category "which can replace property completely" (Vukićević, 1998, 73-4).

The state, for example, acts as an institution, which protects ownership, but also as an owner. As an institution, which protects ownership, the state should treat all the owners equally and as an owner it should be on equal terms with all other owners. In the former case it could be said that state functions as *property*, institutionalized through a social process, which is derived from the very self of man and his community and their generic nature and this in fact could be marked as a necessary characteristic of ownership. In the same manner, an official, a policeman or a minister has a right to carry out a certain job, but it does not mean that he is an owner and that his service can provide him with ownership rights.

In this context we can explain the fact that ownership can exist without an owner; there are ownership rights of a not yet conceived human being, a human being who existed but does not exist any longer, welfare cases and families etc. In such cases the state serves as an institution, which secures and protects ownership from the point of view of man as a property being and from the point of view of his community.

By turning property characteristics (of nature, non-products, community etc.) into ownership, which is so disturbingly frequently done in our pragmatic, bureaucratized, estranged and artificial social reality, their original nature is inevitably questioned. By reducing nature (non-produced) to ownership it is treated as if it were pro-

duced in a working, creative act of a specific owner. By this reduction we also turn community into a collective and its contents and they acquire the nature of ownership, i.e. there is a dominance of certain subjects over the others.

The overall discussion on the relationship between property and ownership points out that the concept of man as a proprietor is much wider from the concept of man as an owner. When we take into account the value of human self, we can argue even more convincingly that the categorization of man in the sense of property is of a different quality from the categorization of man in the sense of ownership.

The same is valid for human community or society. Property and ownership are complementary categories. The social phenomenon of satisfying material and spiritual needs, which is institutionalized in every society on the basis of property and ownership, is shaped by these two categories. Property is a sign of man's permanent sociability, while ownership is a sign of permanent individuality (unity). Property institutionalizes the things we can have and the way we can acquire material and spiritual values. Ownership institutionalizes material and spiritual values we have, the way these values are possessed, used and controlled. Bases and consequences of property and ownership are peculiar in all the elements of "ontological features" – in the area of identity preservation and the stability of material and social conditions. These relations enable a sociological explanation of the correlation between property and ownership and the development of man and society (Vukićević, 2002, 134).

3. Property

Property develops and changes through a historical development and existence of man and his community i.e. society.

Natural surroundings in which the community develops and lives are taken to be the property of the community just because of people's *communal* life.

The act of togetherness created by a sublimation of different elements has a special reality which produces property i.e. property relations both from the point of view of an individual and a community. Property represents an act of togetherness and a real social event of need fulfillment, while a community is a feature and a creative act of property.

The formation of man's generic essence is closely tied to the creation of property relation with nature, especially by using community as an instrument. This is man's historically acieved beginning. Community as a kind of property determines man's individuality and his nature. First beginnings reveal an individual as a partial personality who is not independent from or within his community. The moment he achieves his full authonomy within his community, in form of a pure independence of self, he becomes an individual. This makes the individual achieve his universality, a non-divisible totality of his self and his existence. *This progressiveness is an exclusive posibility of property relation as a generic category*. Property relation becomes a generic basis of sociological ontology and ontics and is being realized in each community or society through a process of institutionalization of acquisition, possession, usage and control of material and spiritual values.

At the beginning, also, the community has no other property apart from its members. In the same way, the moment man stops to belong exclusively to nature, community becomes an exclusive property.

In the genesis of the historically acieved beginning of an individual and his community, property relation as a social phenomenon developed a dual quality: 1) by means of community it achieved property individuality and 2) community starts to belong exclusively to an individual as its member. All further subject and object elements of property, its forms and surrogates, spring from these two qualities and lead to the formation of ownership as a kind of pure possession.

The same process involves the historically achieved beginning of community which produces its genericity in form of a social nature. The development of civilizations could not change the basis of this phenomenon. Only the character of certain elements was being changed, also the way in which reason and history interacted. Modernism and post-modernism represent a special unity of mind and history.

Property lives as an expression of nature of human and his community and it is being institutionalized at the level of each concrete community as a category of possesson, acquisition, controlling and using or as a fulfillment of material and spiritual needs.

Property is not, thus, left at a universal level of generic nature of man and his community but it is a concrete social phenomenon, connected to the needs of people in a concrete community. Each community or a concrete society institutionalizes property relations and reasonably, it cannot avoid conflicts caused by the interaction between reason and history, community and its members, more precisely a conflict between the logic of property and social reality. Institutionalized property relation is, first of all, connected to a community or a society as a whole and as such it offers a framework for the institutionalization of ownership.

Having in mind that man and his community are property beings (independent, reasonable, sensible), we have to point out that "there is no such a system, even less a land, whose primary function is to fulfill the needs and aspirations of the whole world/country" (Peru, 1986, 164). However, this feature of property is followed by the fact that "human homeland can on no account develop of its own accord" (Peru, 1986, 164). It follows that defining, self-defining, sense and reason of possesson, acquisition, control and usage of material and spiritual values are also active in the relation with and the treatment of the other.

Institutionalized property relation as a general social phenomenon, which determines social relations in a community or a society at the level of fulfillment of material and spiritual needs, gets realized as ownership, both within a community and interaction with other communities and members of other communities.

In a pure individuality of material and spiritual needs, personal needs are developed and their fulfillment is also possible in a relationship with the other. The fulfillment is a phenomenon of a generic nature because it develops solely as a social phenomenon... This means that property relation is a natural phenomenon, which reveals human nature i.e. man as a special species and a phenomenon sui generiss. Property relation is institutionalized in a society as a legal institute of property. Property could be defined as an institutionalized scheme of society's aims and relations, which are connected to the fulfillment of material and spiritual needs. It contains a generic value of man and his community, which is ontologically rooted in the tendency of man and his community to satisfy their material and spiritual needs according to social norms.

4. Ownership

Determined by property relations, man and his community are just prerequisites for social production, while ownership is connected to the consequences of this production. Work is not only a primary factor of owner's production, but it becomes a new factor of community integration, with its numerous consequences for the individual and the community.

On the basis of individual production, a process of development of different collectives and differences between members of community is initiated. The collective and certain members of it, create their conditions and become owners on the basis of their own production; in order to satisfy their needs they possess, use and control material and spiritual values.

Ownership is a social phenomenon as well, but it differs from property with respect to its contents and the consequences it has for both individual and community. Primarily on the basis of work ownership produces a differentiation between subjects of a community and between communities. However, work is not the only basis of ownership. As far as possession, acquisition, controlling and using of values are concerned, a person may become an owner by inheritance, application of laws or other social norms, violent actions or abuse. However, all these are just secondary or derived forms, when compared to work and the consequences of personal work. Of course, this fact does not reduce sociological interests for these forms of ownership. Sociology is interested in how ownership rights become established, what their effects on certain individuals, groups, and categories of people, organizations, society and its progress in general are.

There is a number of other consequences so that a whole range of property and generic phenomena is turned or reduced to ownership i.e. a government monopoly. In such a situation community is not communal because it is not equally a prerequisite and a constitutive element of need fulfillment of all its members. In such a situation community does not exclusively aspire to a general good, but by means of ownership it seeks to fulfill some special needs.

These relations and processes may be of a great help to our understanding of the process of differentiation between property and ownership. We cannot, anyway, create a one-sided picture. Although property as a generic essence of man and his community is an important prerequisite for the development of ownership, one cannot with precision determine whether property had developed before ownership. It is also even less possible to determine whether the process went from simpler to complex i.e. from ownership to property. The most realistic explanation would be that the two were developing simultaneously.

Consequences have to be stressed as very important here, especially in the area of sociology, which tends to give a full account of social phenomena, sublimation of lusts and interests and especially of such social categories as property and ownership are. The effects that property and ownership have on individuals, group, institution and society as a whole, are very important for distinguishing one from the other and also for distinguishing these two social categories from other social categories.

Because of its values and cultural contents it has, interests and needs it satisfies and effects it has on an individual and a community, ownership is a specific social category whose validity is greatly determined by a property relations scheme of each concrete community or society. In such a way, private, state or any other ownership, takes different forms in different societies and represents a pure possession and dominance in possession, acquisition and control of objects. It expresses itself in the institutionalized act of possession, acquisition, control and usage of material and spiritual values by concrete subjects in a society. Ownership represents a special social object — a special social phenomenon that regulates acquisition, possession, control and usage of material and spiritual values.

5. The topicality of property-ownership relation in a post-socialist transformation of society

The relationship of Nature's Great Deed and Man's Great Deed produces lusts and interests, what makes it very important not to forget their origins. This eternal law of Nature, Man and his Community cannot also be avoided in the transformation of post-socialist societies. It has to be considered in the development of all the social institutions, especially those concerned with property and ownership. The peculiarity of property and ownership institutions includes implicitly their interactive feature.

There is a famous hypothesis that capitalism "activates benign human inclinations at expense of malign ones" and that by using a benign lust for material values it plays an important role in preventing violence (Hirschman, 1999, 10). In some other theories positive roles of interests are given a greater stress and are better explained. Besides their role in getting rich, interests play an important role in allocation of resources on the basis of information economy and encouraging personal initiatives instead of nourishing a negative denial of lusts. James Stuart praises interests as "the most efficient check on the stupidity of despotism". It follows that interests play a crucial role in creating a character of a political system and its transformations. On the basis of this, a stress can be placed on a progressiveness of capitalism, which, by its logic fosters some benign human qualities and suppresses or possibly eradicates some more destructive and fatal human impulses.

Montesquieu stresses that a commercial spirit (as a characteristic of capitalism) implies a spirit of modesty, economy, moderation, diligence, sense, tranquility, order and lawfulness. While this spirit stays alive, the wealth that it produces does not leave any bad consequences (according to Hirschman, 1999, 91). Montesquieu warns that democracy could only be kept in case the existing wealth is not too big and unequally distributed. It is obvious that without the effects certain elements of living have on man and society, we cannot explain and discuss certain phenomena as units. That is why we have to point out a lucid warning of Montesquieu: "people have to consider themselves very fortunate that whenever they get an impulse to do evil, they find some other reason to do well" (Hirschman, 1999, 93).

Smith's hypothesis that a material welfare of the whole society gets improved when everybody is allowed to follow his personal interest represents a human being's split into two. It reduces man to 1) homoprivatus who ignores public interest and thus "forgets" about his social nature; 2) all man's creativity and sense get reduced to private interests, which are connected to material welfare. This reduction prevents us from understanding that formation of private interest and also the factor of global, endogenous and integral development of a society are socially conditioned.

The term interest was being used in a variety of meanings, not only in the sense of wealth but also in the sense of power and influence. However, the processes, which the term interest denotes, narrow its meaning to a lust for material goods.

In France and England the idea of interest gains a similar understanding. It gains a meaning of a disciplined understanding of measures that have to be taken to increase somebody's power, influence and wealth.

Considering the wide meaning of "interest" as a notion, back in 18th century, Helvetius, in spite of his enthusiasm for lusts, noted the following: "the same way physical world is governed by laws of movement, so is moral universe governed by laws of interest" (Hirschman, 1999, 65). However, when the meaning of the notion of interest was narrowed to material gain, the idea that "interest governs world was doomed to lose a great deal of its appeal". On the contrary, it is used in a negative sense that "the world is governed by nothing else but interest" (Hirschman, 1999, 69).

This sociological fact is an important prerequisite for overcoming the restriction of "pure economy" or "vulgar materialism", which are sooner or later demonstrated not only at the social and human level but also in the sphere of economic efficiency.

Hirschman shows that this does not prevent the identification of certain advantages of the world, which is governed by interests. These advantages are *predictability and stability*. In fact the biggest advantages of predictability of human behaviour which is based on interest, appear in the area of economic dealings of an individual. This creates a real basis for a social system which would be suitable for living. "If you are able to predict an interst of a man on every occasion, then you can surely decide how to face him i.e. how to predict his intentions" (Hirschman, 1999, 70). We have to warn here that even if we supposed that people gave precedence to public interests over their own they could never be governed. "The interests of everyone's country could be shown in a wrong manner, so that it may happen that while trying to defend these interests individuals may go against them" (Hirschman, 1999, 71).

A very interesting and topical question is how private and public interests are defined in the model (models) of transformation of post-socialist society. As far as the transformation of interest is concerned the question is 1) whether the importance and meaning of this notion had evolved from the time of socialism 2) into the one which suits a new society; 3) whether property and ownership in the model of transformation are given in an institutionalized and institutionalizing form which suits a new society.

It is important to state that the importance and meaning of the notion of "interest" in sociology was determined more according to the meaning it was ascribed to by people at certain times, not according to its real contents (Vukićević, 2002, 126-7). Maybe, the most important question, then, is what makes people be sociable beings and what the role of lusts and interests in the process is? One may suppose that this happens under certain circumstances or due to the nature of a certain social system.

This issue is also very topical in the process of transformation of post-socialist countries. The question is which forces in a model (models) of transformation, especially in the model of property and ownership, drive people to be selfish or sociable? What sort of relation exists between lusts and interests in this process? What happened to socialist (state, public) property in the process of transformation (corporate property, natural resources, business premises etc.)? What happened to "stupidities of despotism" from the time of socialism: are they gone or are they still alive in the same or a changed form. What sort of relationship exists between Politics and Economy?

Modern society as a community of citizens, to which postsocialist countries aspire, is out of question unless the reality of public interest is considered separately from that of private interest. Besides, one has to be aware that the process of metamorphosis of lusts has to be carried out as a social process which determines the essentials of a society (Vukićević, 2002, 1267). Only in this context the lusts can become benign. It does not mean that they stop being natural, but only that they acquire features of counterweight so that relatively harmless things can be used as an opposition to dangerous and destructive ones. It is important to be aware that lusts cannot be left out, nor can they be controlled by pressure and coercion only.

What are the essentials of lust beneficiality, as produced by the transformation of post-socialist societies? Property as a general social phenomenon of acquisition, possession, and distribution of material and spiritual needs has to be considered separately from the

pure possession of concrete subjects and their dominance in the distribution of objects of ownership. The question is whether the models of transformation of post-socialist countries create negative impulses, not those that would have a benign effect on man and society. Do these models pay attention to these questions at all?

The general topicality of these problems is obvious because terrible consequences of base instincts are felt globally. The problem is made even more complicated by the fact that reason too must not be taken as absolute, nor can the philosophy of the relation "lust destructive and reason unproductive" be neglected.

Hirschman hopes that the shortcomings of both lust and reason will be overcome. He puts all his hopes into the category of interests, in which egoism is improved and controlled by reason, while reason is moved and strengtened by this lust. The produced hybrid of human behavior is taken as freed from destructive instincts and unproductiveness of reason.

Is interest in the model (models) of post-socialist societies presented in such a way that it leads to a removal of destructive instincts and unproductiveness of reason? What is the meaning and importance of interest for man and society within the model of post-socialist societies? Also, what is the meaning and importance of interest in these societies in the sense of "a normative fact", that is what the attitudes of individuals, institutions and organizations are towards formation, functioning and changes of the model of transformation?

In this sense a very important question is in what sort of relationship property, ownership and the development of these societies stand. Is there a difference between the process of transformation and socialism in sense of the conditions they offer for expressing working efficiency and creativity in general? What is the destiny of workers: what happened to the workers in production and those employed in other branches? What sort of status have they acquired from the point of view of property and ownership? If the transformation of post-socialist societies is understood as their peculiar development, then this development has to be regarded as "a dimension of the very being of a society or a true adventure in which a society is involved with all of its self-creative abilities" (Peru, 1986,1). This means that the sociological explanation and under-

standing of transformation of post-socialist societies has to start form the "Ideal type" of transformation, which is based upon the question of whether self-creative forces are likely to function in these societies. Of course, the task is to reveal the causes of departure from the "Ideal type". Functioning of self-creative forces is not taken here in the sense of economical efficiency only, but in the sense of a general activism in a society. The approach is clear: the question is what sort of activism of individuals, collectives, institutions and organizations is created by property and what sort of activism is created by ownership (Vukićević, 2002). Simply, in the process of transformation of post-socialist societies it is important to distinguish the course of changes of property from that which characterizes the domain of ownership.

In the text to follow theoretical facts which are relevant both for the creation of valid post-socialist transformation models and their timely practical application are set forth.

In all phases of transformation we have to consider two levels of interests: 1) public interests (general good); 2) private interests. The realization of both of them has to move from micro level to the global level of society and besides the peculiarity and incompatibility of public and private interests there has to be a number of uniform features, which connect them.

Therefore, sociologically and socially it is very important to identify what exactly happened in the process of transformation to 1) the prediction of interests; 2) stability of interests; 3) public interest; 4) private interest; 5) the extent to which interests are imposed by a new elite; 6) the way in which "the social system" of transformation is arranged in the sense of interests; 7) the sort of relationship that exists between interests, business and a motivation for success; 8) the possibility of private interest identification or reduction to the meaning it is ascribed to by individuals or certain social groups.

The most central problem in the transformation of post-socialist societies is the development of property relations' structure and a corresponding institutional and political superstructure, which will extract a concrete ownership structure with a substantial business initiative and a motive for the realization of all its components. This is exactly what socialism governed and planned production of social life suppressed all the time.

Besides, one has to be aware of property and ownership as *institutionalizing*, *not only institutionalized* categories. That means that all its substantial contents, community's work and form are defined institutionally and also that property and ownership as institutions have a strong retroactive effect on all the subjects of social reality.

The retroactive effect of the property and ownership structure is of a special importance for such periods as are the periods of postsocialist transformation and the development of new institutions.

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